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Abstract
In recent years Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) has emerged as
the most paradigmatic example of Quantum technology allowing the real-
ization of intrinsically secure communication links over hundreds of kilo-
meters. Beyond its commercial interest QKD also has high conceptual
relevance in the study of quantum information theory and the founda-
tions of quantum mechanics. In particular, the discussion on the minimal
resources needed in order to obtain absolutely secure quantum communi-
cation is yet to be concluded. Here we present an overview on our last ex-
perimental results concerning two novel quantum cryptographic schemes
which do not require some of the most widely accepted conditions for re-
alizing QKD. The first is Goldenberg-Vaidman protocol [1], in which even
if only orthogonal states (that in general can be cloned without altering
the state) are used, any eavesdropping attempt is detectable. The second
is N09 protocol [2] which, being based on the quantum counterfactual ef-
fect, does not even require any actual photon transmission in the quantum
channel between the parties for the communication.
Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [3, 4] is beyond doubt the most promising
application in the field of quantum technologies. It is a method that allows two
distant partners to share a common key to be used in order to perform a cryp-
tographic communication whose security does not depend on the technological
level of an eventual spy, being based on the fundamental laws of nature and in
particular on the properties of quantum systems.
In the last decade QKD is moving from laboratories to become a mature
technology for commercialization [5]; communications over more than 100 km
having been achieved both in fiber [6] and open air [7].
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However, beyond its commercial interest QKD represents also a fruitful test
bed of concepts and ideas blossoming from quantum information theory and
studies on foundations of quantum mechanics [3, 4, 10, 42, 1, 43, 44, 8, 9]. In this
paper, after a general introduction to the topic, we present an overview on two
novel QKD schemes, based on orthogonal states, which bring groundbreaking
contribution in the debate on the actual resources needed to ensure the security
of quantum communication. Indeed, before the proposal of Goldenberg and
Vaidman [1] it was considered as established that non-orthogonal or entangled
states were needed for QKD. This proposal, and later the one of T. G. Noh [2],
demonstrated that non-orthogonality is not necessary, opening a new chapter for
quantum communication, QKD with orthogonal states. The paper is structured
as follows: the first section after some brief historical information is addressed
to the introduction of quantum cryptography and the description of the most
studied protocols; the second section introduces the Goldenberg and Vaidman
protocol based on the use of orthogonal states and describes its experimental
implementation[11]; the third section concerns the N09 protocol as proposed
by T. G. Noh, also dubbed Counterfactual QKD and its realization[12]; finally
some final remarks and future perspectives are discussed.
1 From classical to quantum cryptography
In this section a brief introduction on classical and quantum cryptography is
given. The aim is to follow the historical path that led to current cryptographic
systems and quantum cryptography.
1.1 Classical Cryptography
Cryptography concerns methods to encode messages so as to ensure privacy
from anyone other than the authorized users. Generally, the exchange of mes-
sages takes place between two characters named Alice (A) and Bob (B). A third
character, Eve (E), attempts to intercept and decode the message. The message
to be sent from Alice to Bob is usually dubbed “cleartext”. To do this transmis-
sion safely Alice uses an algorithm (crypto-system or “cipher”) able to combine
the cleartext with some additional information (“key”) which is shared in an
exclusive way between A and B. The text thus obtained is called “cryptogram”.
Crypto-analysis, which is the study of how to decode a ciphered text with-
out being in possession of the key, evolves in parallel to the development of
cryptography.
Cryptography protocols can be divided into two main classes: symmetrical
and asymmetrical. Protocols for which the key used to encrypt the message
is the same that is used to decode it, belong to symmetrical cryptography.
In asymmetric cryptographic systems, the key used to encrypt the message is
different from that used to decode it.
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1.2 Symmetrical Key Distribution Protocols
The cryptographic systems with symmetrical key are the most intuitive and
oldest methods used to encode messages.
For example, one of the most ancient crypto-systems is the Spartan scy-
tale The scytale is composed of a wood stick around which is coiled a tape. The
result is a cylindrical surface to write. Unrolling the tape and reading the mes-
sage leads to a sequence of letters apparently without meaning. This sequence
recovers its original significance when the tape is rewound on a stick with the
same diameter to the original one. In this case the key of the protocol is the
wood stick. The two parties must possess a wood stick of same diameter for
exchange messages.
Another important cryptographic system has its origin back in Julius Caesar
times. The Caesar cipher requires each letter that composes the message to
be replaced with one that is three positions ahead in the alphabetic order as
shown in Table 1.
Normal alphabet A B C D E F G H I L M N O P Q R S T U V Z
Chiper alphabet D E F G H I L M N O P Q R S T U V Z A B C
Table 1: Caesar chiper
In this case the key of system is 3, corresponding to the number of positions
shifted. Obviously, with the same system is possible to use different keys. A
trivial example that illustrates the protocol is shown in Table 2.
cleartext N O C T E A D O R T I
ciphertext Q R F Z H D G R U Z N
Table 2: Example of application of Caesar cipher
Obviously, a cipher like this is very simple to decrypt as the key has only 20
possible values. Caesar cipher and, in general, all methods for which a letter is
encoded with the same symbol for the entire length of the message are said to be
based on monoalphabetic substitution. This type of cryptographic systems
can be decrypted by applying a technique known as frequency analysis. The
first known recorded explanation of frequency analysis (indeed, of any kind of
cryptanalysis) was given in the 9th century by Al-Kindi, an Arab polymath, in
“A Manuscript on Deciphering Cryptographic Messages”. It has been suggested
that close textual study of the Qur’an first brought to light that Arabic has a
characteristic letter frequency. Frequency analysis is based on the fact that, in
any given stretch of written language, certain letters and combinations of letters
occur with varying frequencies. Moreover, there is a characteristic distribution
of letters that is roughly the same for almost all samples of that language.
For instance, given a section of Italian language, E, A, I and O are the most
common, while Z, Q and V are rare. So by analyzing a message, coded with the
monoalphabetic substitution, one can obtain the frequency spectrum of each
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symbol. Comparing it with the one relative to the letters of a given language
one can derive the key to decrypt the message.
The natural evolution of this cryptographic system is the use of more than
one alphabet for encoding the message. The key will be used to indicate which
alphabet to use for each letter. This type of cryptographic system is known
as polyalphabetic substitution. The first complete description of a crypto-
graphic system based on polyalphabetic substitution dates back to Leon Bat-
tista Alberti (circa 1467), who used a metal cipher disc to switch between cipher
alphabets. Alberti’s system only switched alphabets after several words, and
switches were indicated by writing the letter of the corresponding alphabet in
the ciphertext.
Years later, in 1508, Johannes Trithemius invented the Tabula Recta. The
tabula recta is a square table of alphabets, each row of which is made by shifting
the previous one to the left. In his system data are encrypted by switching
each letter of the message with the letter directly below, using the first shifted
alphabet. The next letter is switched by using the second shifted alphabet, and
this continues until the end of the message.
Around 1586 Blaise de Vigene`re developed a more secure system always
based on Tabula Recta. This protocol is called Vigene`re cipher. The differ-
ence from the previous one is that the sequence of alphabets used to encrypt the
message was not consecutive, but dictated by a word or phrase: the key. Each
letter of the key is matched with a letter of the message, the key is repeated
along the length of the message. In Table 3 is shown a simple example on the
operation of the Vigene`re cipher, where the keyword is: “GREEN”.
Cleartext K I L L K I N G T O M O R R O W M I D N I G H T
Key G R E E N G R E E N G R E E N G R E E N G R E E
Cryptogram Q Z P P X O E K X B S F V V B C D M H A O X L X
Table 3: Vigene`re cipher
For many years this cryptographic system was considered impossible to vi-
olate. In 1863 the first publication on an attack at the Vigene`re cipher was
realized. This method, known as Kasiski examination, allows to determine the
length of the key; then one can apply the frequency analysis on each alphabet.
The Kasiski examination consists in the research in the encrypted text of equal
strings. If these are encoded with the same part of the key then the distance
between the parts must be an integer multiple of the key length. Moreover, the
key was usually a word or a phrase whereby is not necessary to earn each let-
ter with the frequency analysis. For example if one obtained from the analysis
only a few letters of the key as “G*EE*” is not difficult to understand that the
keyword is “GREEN”.
In 1917 Gilbert Vernam, an engineer at Bell Labs, modified the Vigene`re
cipher to make it more secure. The Vernam cipher is also called One-Time
Pad. This cryptographic system is based on three conditions:
• the key must have the same length of the message
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• it must be used only one time
• it must be randomly generated
The condition on the key length makes the single message completely immune
from the frequency analysis. Notwithstanding that the same type of alphabet
is used for encoding more than one letter it is impossible to determine where
this alphabet is used. The second condition addresses the issue that if the
key is used more than one time, in principle, Eve can collect all messages and
then apply the frequencies analysis on the same position of all texts. Finally,
if the key is randomly generated no correlation between successive alphabets
can be found, at variance with the case of Vigene`re cipher. After the end
of World War II (1949) Claude Shannon demonstrated that One-time pad is
unbreakable [13].With the development of computer science all communications
have been converted to digital encoding, so both the key and the message are
now composed by digital bits. As a consequence, all cryptographic systems
are now based on binary operations. For example for encoding messages the
logic XOR operation is used between the key and the message bits. The three
conditions necessary for the cipher to work present different practical difficulties.
In fact, the problem of the frequent transmission of the key bits (which have to
be strictly random) through a secure channel leads to the main technological
issue related to modern cryptography (key distribution). However this problem
can in principle be solved with the use of quantum cryptography as we shall
address in section 1.4.
1.3 Asymmetrical Key Distribution
The second class of cryptographic protocols is composed by asymmetrical cryp-
tosystems, more commonly called public key cryptosystems. The fundamental
characteristic of these protocols is that the key used for encoding the message
(called “public key”) is different from the one used to decode it (called “private
key”). The public key is exchanged between Alice and Bob through a public
channel and it could be, in principle, intercepted by Eve. On the contrary, the
private key remains always in possession of Alice and Eve cannot get hold of it
in any way. Another fundamental characteristic of this kind of protocols is the
possibility of establishing a shared secret-key over an authenticated (but not
private) communications channel without using a prior shared secret. To give
an idea of how the asymmetric protocols work, suppose that Bob wants to send
a message to Alice. Imagine that Alice sends Bob a box and an open padlock
(public key). Bob puts the message in the box, closes it with the padlock and
sends the box to Alice. Alice can open the box with the key of the padlock that
has always remained only in her possession (private key). In principle, a copy
of the padlock can be in possession of Eve but nevertheless she can not open
the box in any way. In general this type of protocol is implemented by using a
class of mathematical functions called one-way functions. These functions have
the characteristic of being easily computed with any input but they are hard
to invert. The terms “easy” and “hard” are in this context to be intended in
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terms of computational time requested to solve the given problem. In partic-
ular, a function can be considered “easy” to compute if the evaluation time is
proportional to a power of the length of the input string (polynomial class). On
the other hand, a function is said “hard” to compute if the time is instead an
exponential function of the length of the input string.
One of the unsolved problems in computer science is to prove the existence
of these functions: all the functions that are generally included in this class
are actually the ones for which an algorithm to solve them in polynomial time
has not been found yet, but it is not proved that such an algorithm does not
exist. In terms of functions Alice builds the public key f(x) and the private key
f−1(x). She sends f(x) to Bob. Bob computes the function with the message
M and he obtains f(M). The fundamental concept is that obtaining f−1(x)
only with f(x) as a starting point is a “hard” task. Finally Bob sends f(M) to
Alice and than she computes f−1(f(M)) =M retrieving the message.
The most important public-key protocol is RSA, originally invented in 1978
by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman. The security of the protocol is based on the
apparent difficulty of the integer factorization problem. The integer factoriza-
tion is a much discussed problem. To date, the best way to solve it is the use
of a class O(exp((649 L)
1
3 (logL)
2
3 )) algorithm, where L is the length of the key.
So this problem is “hard” to resolve as it need exponential computational time.
Even if RSA is the most used cryptosystem for commercial use, however, there
is no proof that there cannot be more efficient algorithms. Based on current
algorithms and computational power of computers, to ensure the security of the
protocol, the key must be at least 2048 bits. In 1994, Peter Shor showed that a
quantum computer would be able to solve factorization problem in polynomial
time, thus giving the possibility to break RSA protocol [16].
1.4 Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum states present some particular properties which can be exploited to
perform a secure exchange of information between two parties. In particular
to obtain a secure shared key to be used in a one-time-pad protocol. For this
reason Quantum Cryptography was introduced or, more properly, Quantum
Key Distribution (QKD).
The first idea of Quantum Cryptography was proposed by Stephen Wiesner,
at Columbia University in New York in the early 1970s. He introduced the
concept of quantum conjugate coding. Initially his work was refused by IEEE
Information Theory and it was published only in 1983 by SIGACT News (Special
Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory) [14]. About one year
later Charles H. Bennet and Gilles Brassard announced a protocol of quantum
cryptography based on non-orthogonal states [15].
The most of the Quantum Cryptography protocols are based on the No-
Cloning theorem.
This theorem asserts that it is impossible to copy exactly (cloning) an a
priori unknown quantum state. However, cloning is possible if the state belongs
to a set of orthogonal states known. This is important considering a scenario in
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which A and B decide to exchange information coded in the states of quantum
systems. The most simple strategy that E can use is to intercept the state sent
by A before it reaches B, to measure it, to copy it and then send the copy to
Bob (intercept-resend attack). Let us consider two quantum states | ψ〉 e | φ〉
to be cloned and an auxiliary state | s〉 which is intended to become the clone
(target state).
| ψ〉 | s〉 →| ψ〉 | ψ〉 (1)
If it is possible to perform the cloning then a unitary operator U must exist
such that:
U(| ψ〉 | s〉) =| ψ〉 | ψ〉
U(| φ〉 | s〉) =| φ〉 | φ〉
and by taking the scalar product of the two equation one would obtain:
〈ψ | φ〉 = 〈ψ | φ〉〈ψ | φ〉 (2)
For the former equation to be true one should have 〈ψ | φ〉 equal either to 1
or 0, meaning that | ψ〉 and | φ〉 are equal or orthogonal respectively. In any
other case U does not exist so it is not possible to clone an a priori unknown
quantum state. This means that if E tries to perform an intercept-resend attack,
the states sent by E to B will be uncorrelated to the original states generated
by A, leading to errors in the transmission that can highlight the presence of
the eavesdropper.
The first and most important QKD protocol was proposed in 1984 by Charles
Bennet and Gilles Brassard during a conference in India [15]. This protocol in-
volves the use of polarized photons in two non-orthonormal bases: one rectilinear
( |↔〉 e | l 〉) and one diagonal (|ր〉 |ց〉). Suppose that for each base the first
state correspond to the bit 0 and the second to bit 1. The protocol can be
implemented as follows:
• key transmission: Alice prepares a random sequence of bits (Table 4 a)
and a random sequence of bases (choosing between the rectilinear and the
diagonal one) (4 b) to encode them. Bob prepares a random sequence of
bases to perform the measurement 4 d). Alice then sends a succession
of linearly polarized photons according to the chosen bits and bases 4 c).
Bob projects each photon according to the chosen bases and stores the
results of the measurements;
• public discussion: Alice e Bob announce on the public channel the se-
quence of chosen bases. Bob keeps the results related to the measure-
ments with compatible bases and discard the others. Alice also keeps
the bits corresponding the states for which the same basis has been used.
The sequences of bits obtained in this way by A and B are now iden-
tical (assuming no noise and no eavesdropping). This is to be used as
cryptographic key;
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• error detection: To check for the eventual presence of E in the commu-
nication channel, A and B sacrifice random portions of the shared string
and publicly compare their positions and values (or the parities of corre-
sponding subsets) before discarding them. The remaining bits are called
sifted key.
a)... 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
b)... D R D R R R R R D D R D D D R
c)... ր l ց ↔ l l ↔ ↔ ց ր l ց ր ր l
d)... R D D R R D D R D R D D D D R
e)... 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
f)... R D R D D R R D D D R
g)... ok ok ok ok ok ok
h)... 1 1 0 1 0 1
i)... 1 0
l)... ok ok
m)... 1 0 1 1
Table 4: Scheme of BB84 protocol
In the following years many experimental implementations of BB84 have
been performed and several alternative protocols have been proposed, almost
all of them based on the use of non-orthogonal states. Since this work is not
intended to give an exhaustive review on that kind protocols, but rather in-
troduce experiments which do not require such states, we refer on the subject
to other important works [3, 4, 10, 42, 43, 44, 17, 18, ?, 19, ?, 20, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29]. Let now us mention just another possible attack that
can be performed by Eve. Eve’s possible attacks discussed above are based
on the attempt to get the maximum information out of the qubits exchanged
between Alice and Bob. Eve can also adopt a completely different strategy:
she can send herself signals in the quantum channel toward Alice’s or Bob’s
secure zones. This kind of strategies are called Trojan horse attacks. Eve can
send light pulses in the fibers entering in Alice’s and Bob’s systems and analyze
the back-reflected light. In principle, with this analysis, is possible to deter-
mine which detector just fired, which laser just flashed and which polarization
is set. However, the back-reflected light is extremely low so this type of attack
is difficult to perform. Eve, to avoid being revealed, can send light pulses with
a wavelength completely different to that used for the protocol and in which
A and B detectors are inefficient. This strategy can be prevented by the use
of filter with a transmission spectrum corresponding to the sensitivity of the
detectors. The mere fact that this type of attacks exists makes it clear that
the security of QC cannot be guaranteed only by the use of quantum mechanic
properties but also requires technological countermeasures.
2 Goldenberg-Vaidman protocol
In the following we introduce our first implementation of an experiment con-
cerning QKD featuring orthogonal states.
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2.1 GV protocol: the scheme
In the proposal [1], the orthogonal states sent by Alice are the superpositions
of two localized wave-packets, which do not travel simultaneously to Bob, being
separated by a fixed delay. There is a direct correspondence between the state
prepared by Alice and the bit received by Bob, for instance
0 → |Ψ0〉 = 1√
2
(|a〉+ |b〉)
1 → |Ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|a〉 − |b〉),
where |a〉 and |b〉 are two localized wave–packets and the states |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉
are orthogonal. The states |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉 are emitted randomly in time, and
the presence of an eventual eavesdropper can be detected by legitimate users
exploiting the information on the detection times [1].
The protocol works as follows: Alice sends Bob either the state |Ψ0〉 or |Ψ1〉.
The insertion on the quantum channel of the wave-packet |b〉 is delayed
for some amount of time τ with respect to the insertion of wave-packet |a〉.
τ is chosen larger than the traveling time T of photons between Alice’s and
Bob’s locations. Since |b〉 travels through the quantum channel only after the
wave-packet |a〉 has already reached Bob’s site, both wavw-packets are never
simultaneously present in the quantum channels. Nonetheless, the requirement
of τ greater than the traveling time T is not strictly necessary.
[1].
Our proof-of-principle experiment[11] exploits a balanced Mach-Zehnder In-
terferometer (MZI) with two equal optical delays OD1 and OD2. According to
Fig. 1, sources of single photon S0 and S1 at the two input ports of the beam
splitter on Alice side provide single photons propagating in the transmission
channel in the state |Ψ0〉 or |Ψ1〉 respectively. The emission time of the single
photon in one of the two states is absolutely random, but it is registered by
Alice.
while the |b〉 is stored in OD1, wave-packet |a〉 travels from Alice’s to Bob’s
locations along the upper channel and enters in OD2, where it is delayed until
also |b〉 reaches Bob’s site. Thus the two packets interfere as they simultane-
ously reach the second beam-splitter. A click of detector Di deterministically
implies that the single photon state was in the state |Ψi〉, that is, it was sent by
source Si. Two security tests are performed by Alice and Bob to highlight the
possible presence of an eavesdropper. The first is a public comparison between
the sending times ts and the receiving times tr for each photon. If we suppose
that the traveling time between the two parties is T , only the events detected at
time tr = ts+ τ + T are considered as part of the message, while all the others,
highlighting the presence of Eve, are discarded. The second one is the compari-
son of corresponding segments of the users’ bit strings to estimate the quantum
bit error rate (QBER). We underline that in the ideal case discrepancies in the
transmission/detection times or in the bit strings can only be induced by Eve.
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Figure 1: Experimental GV protocol set-up. A single photon source (real-
ized exploiting an heralded single photon source based on parametric down-
conversion (PDC) obtained by pumping with a 406 nm CW laser beam a type I
BBO crystal) can be injected deterministically in either of the two input ports
(S0, S1) of a balanced Mach-Zehnder Interferometer (MZI) , encoding (respec-
tively) bit 0 or 1. The choice is random and performed by passive optics. Alice’s
site is composed by S0, S1 and the first optical delay (OD1). Bob’s location
is composed by the second optical delay (OD2, identical to OD1) and the two
single photon detectors (D0, D1).
For the sake of completeness, let us mention that it was argued by Peres [31]
that this protocol introduced no novel features with respect to BB84. Golden-
berg and Vaidman replied to this claim by stating that while in other protocols
(like BB84) the security is obtained by virtue of non-orthogonality, in GV pro-
tocol it is due to causality, since they proved that super-luminal signaling would
be required for a successful eavesdropping [1]. Furthermore, while all crypto-
graphic schemes require two steps for sending information (sending the quantum
object and then some classical information), in GV protocol only the first step is
needed for communication, the second step being used only for ensuring security
against eavesdropping.
2.2 GV protocol: the experimental setup
The setup of the experiment [11] representing the first realization of the GV
protocol is shown in Fig. 1. The single photon states are obtained exploiting an
heralded single photon source based on parametric down-conversion (PDC) [30].
A CW 100 mW Coherent Cube diode laser system at 406 nm is used to pump a
BBO type I crystal. PDC photons pairs at degeneracy (812 nm) are emitted in
slightly non-collinear regime (three degrees with respect to the pump direction).
The heralding photons are selected by means of 1 nm bandwidth interference
filters, collected in a multimode optical fiber and detected by Single Photon
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Avalanche Photo-diodes (SPAD) detectors. The heralded single photon, the
carrier of the information to be exchanged between Alice and Bob, is collected in
a single mode optical fiber (a 10 nm interference filter is placed on the heralding
arm only for background suppression). The CW laser operation ensures the
generation of photon pairs at random time, and the detection of one photon of
the pair in the heralding arm provides the temporal information on the emission
of the single-photon, as requested by the original proposal. To perform the
proof-of-principle of the QKD scheme, Alice sends bit 0 or 1 by addressing the
encoding photon to the proper input port of the MZI (S0 or S1 respectively).
In our case, this can be achieved just switching the optical fiber from one input
port to another. It is noteworthy to observe that in practical QKD systems
this can be realized exploiting a commercial fast optical switch controlled by
a random number generator. Bob detects the single photons at the output of
the interferometer. The balanced MZI contains both the optical delays and
the transmission channel between the users. In particular, after the input BS
at the Alice side one arm of the interferometer contains a delay line, while on
the other arm the delay line (both delays are based on trombone prisms) is
located at Bob’s side. The positions of the trombones in the optical delays are
adjusted via a closed loop piezo-movement system with nano-metric resolution.
Detection events after the output BS of the interferometer are revealed by SPAD
detectors operating in Geiger mode. The electronics highlighting the presence
of coincident detections is based on Time-to-Amplitude-Converter and Multi-
Channel-Analyzer. In our case the temporal condition for the security of the
QKD scheme is satisfied because the jitter of our detectors (i. e., the uncertainty
in the measurement of the transmission/detection times) is about 300 ps, while
the length of the delay lines is approximately 60 cm corresponding to a storage
time of ∼2 ns. Furthermore, as the signal corresponding to the detection events
on the heralding channel (containing the information on ts) is properly delayed
before exiting from A site, Eve can never access the timing information before
the transmission of each photon is concluded.
The stability of the interferometer has been tested by scanning the position
of Alice’s trombone prism with Bob’s one kept at a fixed position. Fig. 2 shows
the interference fringes of heralded counts. The visibilities (V) are well above
80%, irrespective of which port of the input beam splitter is used to inject the
single photon in the interferometer. Even if, in recent years, very high visibilities
have been achieved in similar setups [32, 33], the results we obtain are absolutely
comparable with those of several important works [34, 35, 36, 37] and they are
absolutely sufficient for a meaningful proof-of-principle of the GV protocol.
2.3 Results and discussion
The quality of the transmission is quantified by the Quantum Bit Error Rate
(QBER =
PWrong
PRight+PWrong
, where PRight (PWrong) is the probability for Bob to
receive a bit value which is equal to (different from) the one sent by Alice),
measured to be 7%. This result has been proven to be stable for hundreds of
seconds as shown in Fig. 3. The main results of our transmission are summarized
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Figure 2: (Color online) Number of detected events per second at detector D0
and D1 as a function of the path length difference ∆l between the two arms of
the interferometer for source S0 (top picture) and S1 (bottom). visibility of the
observed fringes is reported in Tab 1.
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Figure 3: Detection events at both detectors D1 and D0. Top: source S0 is
active, corresponding to the transmission of a string of bit 0. Bottom: source S1
is active, corresponding to the transmission of a string of bit 1. The evaluated
Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) in the two cases areQBERS1 = 0.071±0.014
and QBERS0 = 0.070 ± 0.016 on a series of 60 measurements 5 seconds long,
showing a remarkable phase stability of the interferometer.
13
in Table I.
VD0 VD1 QBER
S0 (89± 1)% (82± 1)% (7.0± 1.6)%
S1 (88± 1)% (85± 1)% (7.1± 1.4)%
Table 5: Main results obtained in our implementation of the QKD protocol
proposed in Ref. [1]. VD0, VD1 are the visibilities of the interference fringes
observed at the two outputs of the interferometer by scanning the path length
difference, QBER is the estimated quantum bit error rate for the transmission.
Finally, some observations regarding the security of this QKD system. De-
spite the fact that an unconditional security proof of the GV protocol is still
not available, we note that an efficient eavesdropping strategy against its ideal
realization has not been found yet. On the contrary, it can be shown that, if a
multi-photon component is present in the signal, an eavesdropper (Eve) can gain
information on the key by performing a beam-splitter attack. For example, Eve
can insert a beam-splitter, in both paths in such a way that the transmitted pho-
tons continue traveling toward Bob while measuring the outputs in the reflected
modes with a duplicated Bob’s detection apparatus. In order to successfully do
this Eve should be present since the initial tuning of the interferometer. The
security issue in QKD protocols based on single photons due to the presence
of multi-photon components is a very deeply investigated subject [3, 4], which
demands ultimately the use of efficient single photon sources. In particular, our
heralded single photon source, presenting a g(2)(0) = 0.06± 0.01, is a good ap-
proximation of an ideal single photon source, thus the information obtained by
an eventual eavesdropper exploiting the presence of multi-photon components
is negligible. In fact, if we attribute the measured QBER value, due to experi-
mental imperfections, to an attack performed by an eavesdropper, the amount
of information on the key obtained by this attack will be much greater than the
one obtained from a beam-splitting attack on our “almost ideal single photons”.
3 Counterfactual Quantum Cryptography
In the following we describe the first implementation of a counterfactual QKD
experiment (Noh09 Protocol). After the introduction of the mechanism of
the counterfactual measurement via the description of famous Elitzur-Vaidman
bomb tester we briefly describe the theoretical proposal, we show the details of
the implementation, we present the experimental data and discuss the results.
3.1 Elitzur-Vaidman bomb tester
The Elitzur-Vaidman bomb tester [39] is a gedanken experiment that shows the
peculiar quantum counterfactual effect. Consider a collection of bombs, some
of which are duds while the remaining ones are usable. The bombs have a
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particular property: each bomb has a perfect photon-triggered sensor which
whenever a photon is absorbed causes the bomb to detonate. We assume that
the efficiency of this sensor is 100% so that all photons that pass through the
sensor will be absorbed. The dud bombs has a malfunctioning sensor that will
not interact with any photon. The problem is how to separate dud bombs
from usable ones without detonating all bombs. For solving this problem the
authors proposed a mode of observation known as counterfactual measurement
or interaction-free measurement. Basically the bomb to analyze is positioned
on one arm of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer. If there is not any bomb, the
photons, due to single photon interference, are detected always from the same
detector. Assume now that this detector is dubbed detector A and that a bomb
is introduced. If the bomb is dud nothing changes because it does not interact
with photons, so they are still detected by detector A. If the bomb is usable, the
interference is broken. In fact, if a photon passes on the lower branch it will be
absorbed by the bomb and it will cause the explosion; instead if it passes on the
upper branch, the photon has a 50% probability to be absorbed by detector A
and 50% to be revealed by detector B. So, if the photon is detected by detector
B it is certain that the bomb is usable, otherwise we can’t conclude nothing.
After the examination of all bombs we will identify about 25% of usable bombs
and detonate about 50% of these. If we repeat the measurement many times,
we are able to discriminate at maximum the 33, 3% of usable bombs. In 1994
the experimental proof of this system was realized[40].
3.2 N09 Protocol: the proposed scheme
The protocol was proposed by Tae-Gon Noh in 2009 (N09) and it presents a
main difference from the previously described protocols: by implementing this
protocol it is possible to perform the secret key distribution without letting the
particle that carries the information even travel through the quantum channel.
This has the clear advantage from the point of view of security that no eaves-
dropper can have direct access to the quantum system of each particle involved
in the communication. In figure 4 (a) the scheme proposed by Noh to realize
his protocol is shown.
Before the description of the implemented protocol it is useful to give a
brief description of the ideal scheme according to the setup originally proposed
by the author (figure 1 of paper [2]), which requires the use of a Michelson
interferometer.
Alice randomly rotates the single photon polarization (which originally is to
be assumed horizontal) by means of a half wave plate (HWPA), either by 0 (bit
value ”0”) or by pi/2 (bit value ”1”). Then, the photon enters one port of a
50 : 50 beam splitter (BS), which is the first element of a Michelson interferom-
eter. After BS, according to the polarization, the photon is in one of the two
orthogonal states:
|φ0〉 = (|0〉A|H〉B + i|H〉A|0〉B)/
√
2 (3)
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|φ1〉 = (|0〉A|V 〉B + i|V 〉A|0〉B)/
√
2 (4)
The path A of the interferometer (containing an optical delay OD and a mirror)
is inside Alice’s sector, while path B reaches Bob’s one.
Bob then randomly selects one of the two polarisations and detects the pho-
ton in this polarisation allowing the photon in the complementary polarisation
to fly back to Alice’s site. This is realized by the HWPB and the Polarizing
beam splitter (PBS). As the PBS addresses the |V 〉 photon towards D2, while
|H〉 photon is sent towards the mirror (M), rotations of the polarization of 0 and
pi/2 induced by the HWPB correspond to the detection of |V 〉 and |H〉 photon
state by D2. If the photon is not detected by D2 but reflected back by M it
passes through the HWPB in the selected position, thus the photon gains back
its original polarization state interfering with itself at BS at Alice’s site and, for
a proper tuning of the optical delay OD, it deterministically exits in D0.
When Alice and Bob select complementary polarization rotations, then ei-
ther the photon is transmitted by BS and detected by Bob at D2 with 50%
probability (since its polarization at PBS is vertical), or it is reflected in path
A. In this case the photon, after passing through the OD twice, returns to the
BS and then it is reflected or transmitted with equal probability (25%). The
first case leads to the clicking of D0, the second corresponds to the photon ar-
riving at D1H or D1V detectors depending on whether its polarization (selected
via another PBS) is horizontal or vertical.
After the detection is completed Alice and Bob can communicate each other
whether or not each of the detectors clicked. If clicked either D0 or D2, with
the purpose of detecting the intervention of an eventual eavesdropper, they an-
nounce both the detected and the initial polarization state. If D1H or D1V
clicks, Alice compares the initial and final polarization states: if they are con-
sistent she does not reveal any information, otherwise she announces her result.
Alice and Bob can then establish a common key by using only the events when
the photon was detected at D1H or D1V (with the correct polarization).
The only apparent difference between the scheme discussed here and the
original proposal in Ref [2] is in the apparatus used by Bob to detect the photon
at D2. Nonetheless the one shown accomplishes exactly the same task, thus the
two schemes should be considered absolutely equivalent. The original scheme
also does not show explicitly the polarization selection system of the photons
as we did with the introduction of D1H and D1V, but the polarization check is
declared to be necessary.
The very interesting point of this scheme is that the selection of events only
at detector D1 correspond to photons that have traveled path A, i.e. never
exited Alice’s sector. Therefore, the task of creating a secret key has been
accomplished without any photon carrying the information having been outside
Alice’s laboratory.
In Ref. [47] a more efficient and complicated CQKD was proposed, whereas
security issues of the N09 protocol were considered in Ref. [48], where it was
proved its unconditional security by considering its equivalence to an entangle-
ment distillation protocol. Finally, very recently, a security proof for intercept-
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: (a): scheme of the setup for Counterfactual QKD experiment equiv-
alent to the one proposed by by Noh [2]. (b) Setup of the implemented version
of the protocol.A 100 mW laser source at 406 nm is used to pump a BBO type
I crystal. In the degenerate regime, one of the PDC twin modes is used as her-
alded single photon and travels in the Mach-Zehnder interferometer including
the two parties and the quantum channel. For each photon A and B perform
randomly and independently either of two possible polarisation rotations (0 or
pi/2), by means of half-wave plates (λ/2). Detection events at the output ports
of the interferometer and at the control output are revealed by Single Photon
Avalanche Photodiodes (D0, D1, D2). The choice of equal polarization rota-
tions leads to interference and consequently in the deterministic clicking of D0,
while the choice of complementary angles results in the statistical distributions
of the clicks among the three detectors. In the latter case, the events revealed
by D1 correspond to the exchange of one bit of information between the users
without the transmission of any photon through the channel.
resend attacks in realistic situation (non unit detector efficiency and presence
of dark counts) was provided [49].
A first attempt to realize experimentally Noh’s scheme is reported in Ref.
[50]. However, this set up missed the key element of CQKD, since the photon
was indeed transmitted between Alice and Bob.
3.3 N09 protocol: the experimental setup
In the following we present the results of our equivalent implementation of the
protocol which is completely analogous to the one of Fig. 1(a), but it is based
on a Mach-Zehnder interferometer instead of a Michelson interferometer and
which is the first real proof-of-principle implementation of counterfactual QKD.
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In our experimental set up, as shown in Fig. 1(b), a heralded single photon
source exploiting parametric down-conversion (PDC) is used : a 100 mW laser
emitting at 406 nm in continuous-wave regime pumps a type-I BBO crystal
producing degenerate PDC at 812 nm. The emission of the PDC photons is
slightly non-collinear corresponding to an emission angle of approximately 3◦
with respect to the pump direction. The heralding photon after passing through
a 10 nm bandwidth interferential filter and a 4 mm wide pinhole is coupled to a
multi-mode fiber and addressed to the trigger detector. The heralded photon,
to be used as our true single photon state, is selected by an interferential filter
(1 nm FWHM) and coupled to a single mode fiber leading to the input of the
interferometer.
The latter is a balanced Mach-Zehnder Interferometer (MZI) in which each
arm has an adjustable trombone prism. One of the two arms is entirely included
in Alice’s site, while the other contains both the quantum channel and Bob’s site,
the latter being composed by a PBS between two half-wave plates (HWPB1,
HWPB2) and D2 detector.
The choice of the Mach-Zehnder in place of the Michelson interferometer
allows to simplify the apparatus, for example the optical circulator in no more
necessary even if the scheme is in principle equivalent to the proposed one.
The balance of the interferometer is guaranteed by a closed–loop piezo–
electric movement system, which stabilizes the position of one of the trombones
regulating the length difference between the two optical paths inside the MZI
with nanometric resolution.
The outputs of the interferometer, after spatial selection via 1mm diameter-
wide irises, are then coupled in multi-mode fiber with no further spectral se-
lection. A polarizer (pol) is also placed before D1 to check the polarization
of the incoming photons. All the signals (including the heralding photons and
D2 clicks) are revealed by Single Photon Avalanche Detectors (SPADs) with a
≈ 60% detection efficiency at 812 nm.
Coincidence and time-tag analysis of the incoming signals are performed by
means of PicoQuant HydraHarp 400 multichannel picosecond event timer. All
the reported data were acquired in measurements of 20 seconds. Our results
show good agreement with the theoretical predictions and represent a proof of
principle of the experimental feasibility of CQKD.
In Fig. 2 interference fringes with high visibility can be observed in the
coincidence counts between the heralding channel and each of the MZI output
detectors D0 and D1 as a function of the displacement of the prism balancing
the interferometer (within the coherence length of the signal, which, according
to the filters used, is of the order of hundreds of µm) when Alice and Bob use
compatible sets of polarization rotation angles ({θA, θB} = {0, 0} or {θA, θB} =
{pi/2, pi/2}). It can also be noticed that for this choice of angles the D2 counts
are consistent with zero as expected. In particular, when no rotation at all is
performed ({0, 0}), the maximum visibilities are (92 ± 4)% for D0 and (96 ±
4)% for D1, while interference gets slightly spoiled for {pi/2, pi/2} where the
visibilities for D0 and D1 are respectively (87±4)% and (91±4)%, values which,
nonetheless, are sufficient for the proof of the protocol. The uncertainty on the
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Figure 5: Coincidence counts between the heralding channel and each of the
MZI output detectors D0, D1 and D2 in 20 seconds acquisitions as a function
of the displacement of the prism balancing the interferometer when Alice and
Bob use compatible sets of angles (top figure: {0, 0}; bottom figure: {pi/2, pi/2}).
For this choice of angles an interference pattern (with visibilities generally above
90%) can be observed in the D0 and D1 counts and also control counts (D2)
are consistent with zero as expected.
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Figure 6: Counting events showing the stability of the interferometer in a half-
an-hour long measurement when the balance of the two optical paths is fixed.
Figure 7: Proof of transmission for the four possible angle choices for A and
B. The segments in which D0 and D1 counts are approximately equal, cor-
responding to the angles ([0,pi/2];[pi/2,0]), are the ones relative to the actual
transmission of information. In those events, the clicking of D1 delivers a bit of
shared information between the users even if no real photon photon travels in
the quantum channel. The estimated value for the QBER of the communication
is (12± 1)%
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visibilities is obtained assuming a Poissonian distribution for the coincidence
counts. Fig. 3 shows the stability of the interferometer in a half-an-hour long
measurement when the balance of the two optical paths is fixed.
The performances of our key distribution process are summarized in Table
I. Corresponding to the angles {0, pi/2} and {pi/2, 0}, D1 and D0 counts are
approximately equal, as in this condition no interference should be present.
These are the events relative to the actual transmission of information. In fact,
the clicking of D1 delivers a bit of the secret key between the users even if no
real photon travels in the quantum channel.
In order to characterize the communication it is necessary to estimate the
Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) defined as the ratio between the probability
for Bob to register an incorrect bit and the sum of the probabilities of getting
either a correct or an incorrect bit. In our case Bob gets an incorrect bit when
D1 clicks even if Alice and Bob use the same angle of polarization rotations
and the events related to the correct transmission are those in which D1 clicks
when interference is destroyed. Furthermore, we notice that when Alice and
Bob use complementary polarizations the amount of photons with the wrong
polarization detected by D1 is effectively null when dark counts are subtracted.
We can thus define QBER as
QBER =
PD1,int
PD1,int + PD1,nint
(5)
where PD1,int is the probability for D1 to register a photon when Alice’s and
Bob’s polarization rotations are equal, such that there is (destructive) interfer-
ence, and PD1,nint is the analogous probability in the case in which Alice and
Bob choose different angles.
For our measurements the mean QBER is QBER = (12 ± 1)%. We un-
derline that all the reported measurements are obtained without subtraction of
background and accidental counts. If we account for these contributions, the cor-
rected QBER value decreases noticeably to QBER′ = (7±1)%, as would be the
case if more reliable detectors were used, such as detectors affected by a lower
dark count rate. As already mentioned, the protocol has been demonstrated
absolutely secure when ideal single photon sources are employed. To address
the security problems eventually raised by the practical implementation of the
protocol, firstly we tested it against possible photon-number-splitting attacks,
i. e. we investigated the quality of of our heralded single photon source. From
the measured count rates we obtained a value of g2(0) = (7 ± 5) ∗ 10−9, which
clearly shows negligible presence of multi-photon components. The reason for
such a small value is related to the very low level of count rates (180 maxi-
mum in 20 seconds acquisitions) at the detectors. This is basically due to the
poor coupling efficiency of the heralded source (approximately 5%), the strict
spectral selection on the heralding photons (1 nm FWHM filtering with 26%
transmittance), and also because of the spatial selection at the interferometers
output (we used irises as narrow as 1mm in diameter to optimize the visibility
of the interference fringes). Furthermore, a small temporal detection window (1
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ns) was selected in correspondence of the arrival of the heralding photon. Be-
cause of this temporal post-selection we mention that unheralded photons may
travel inside the channel and Eve may exploit that to get significant informa-
tion by intercepting them. In order to overcome this security issue, shuttered
heralded single-photon sources [53] should be considered a valuable solution, as
they present comparable performances with respect to the non-shuttered ones.
Future developments of the scheme will include shuttered sources together with
stabilized fiber interferometers for wider distance.
We also address the issue of robustness of the protocol against more general
attacks by computing the difference m = IAB − IAE , where IAB (IAE) is the
mutual information between Alice and Bob (Alice and Eve), in the cases of gen-
eral Intercept-Resend attacks and ”Time-Shift” attacks. Following the models
suggested in Ref. [49], one can express m for the intercept-resend attack as
mIR = PD1[1− h( Pe1
PD1
)], (6)
where PD1, Pe1 are respectively the click probability and the error probability at
D1 and h(x) is the binary Shannon Entropy. We mention that Pe1 in principle
includes not only the probability to register counts at D1 when they are not ex-
pected (0, 0,pi/2, pi/2), but also the probability to detect a photon at D1 with the
wrong polarization. The latter probability has been estimated by counting the
rate of photons impinging in D1 when the polarizer before it is set orthogonally
to the polarization selected by Alice for each of the four angle combinations.
According to the measured counts (1.45± 1.16, 1.2± 1.5, 0.95± 1.24, 0.8± 1.2;
in 20 seconds acquisitions), we estimated a mean value for this probability of
(4± 3) ∗ 10−6.
Regarding the time-shift attack, where Eve exploits the non-ideality of the
detectors, one must subtract from the previous value two contributions, obtain-
ing:
mTS = mIR − γ −∆IAE(η), (7)
where γ accounts for the maximum corrupted bit rate due to dark counts and
∆IAE(η) =
1−η
2η (PD2−Pe2) is the increment of the mutual information between
A and E due to non-unit efficiency of the detectors.
Both values calculated from the collected data are positive (mIR = 0.23 ±
0.04, mTS = 0.15 ± 0.06), ensuring the possibility of distributing a secret key
[3, 4]
Altogether our results provide a satisfying proof-of-principle of the QKD
scheme realized in free-space. Nonetheless, recent results on the implementation
of high stability fiber based Mach-Zehnder interferometers (over distances of the
order of some km) [51, 52] certify the possibility of exploiting this protocol in
”real-life” (as well as commercial) applications.
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{0, 0} {0, pi/2} {pi/2, pi/2} {pi/2, 0}
CD0 180± 4 59± 2 159± 4 59± 2
CD1 7.9± 0.9 53± 2 7.2± 0.9 59± 2
CD2 6.6± 0.8 85± 3 5.4± 0.7 86± 3
VD0 (92± 4)% (0± 4)% (0± 4)% (87± 4)%
VD1 (96± 4)% (0± 4)% (0± 4)% (91± 4)%
QBER (12± 1)%
Table 6: Resume of the main results in the implementation of the CQKD pro-
tocol proposed in Ref. [2]. Each column refers to a set {θA, θB} of polarization
rotation performed by the users and CDi labels the mean coincidence counts
at the i-th detector in acquisition of 20 seconds. VD0, VD1 are the visibilities
of the interference fringes observed at the two outputs of the interferometer by
scanning the path length difference between the two arms of the MZI. QBER
is the estimated quantum bit error rate for the transmission.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we presented an overview on our recent results regarding the first
proofs of principle of two novel QKD schemes using only orthogonal states. The
experimental results demonstrate the security of those protocols while, on the
one hand, they prompt to a further optimization of the schemes, on the other
hand they offer groundbreaking contribution in the discussion on the resources
actually needed to perform secure QKD. The research leading to these results
has received funding from the European Union on the basis of Decision No.
912/2009/EC (project IND06-MIQC), by MIUR-FIRBRBFR10UAUV, and by
Compagnia di San Paolo.
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